

Your Scripts in My Page: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Sebastian Lekies (@slekies) / Ben Stock (@kcotsneb)

Martin Johns (@datenkeller)



Agenda

The Same-Origin Policy

Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

Generalizing XSSI

- Dynamic JavaScript files
- Leaking sensitive data from a JS file


Empirical Study

- Methodology
- Results

Conclusion



The Same-Origin Policy



Same-Origin Policy

“ The Same-Origin policy **restricts communication** of active content to objects that share the same origin. The origin is, hereby, defined by the **protocol**, the **port** and the **host** used to retrieve the object.



The Same-Origin Policy for JavaScript

Inclusion of third-party scripts necessary

- Advertisement, jQuery, ...

Same-Origin Policy relaxed for script inclusion

Included code inherits origin of including site

- both work on same global scope



JSON aka JavaScript Hijacking (2006)

https://attacker.org



Browser

```
http://attacker.org/

<script>
  // Override Array constructor.
  function Array() {
    // Steal data here.
  }
</script>

<script src="//gmail.com/contact.json"></script>
```

A small, round, golden-brown cookie with chocolate chips. An arrow points from the cookie to the JSON data on the right.

https://gmail.com



```
contacts.json

[
  [
    "ct",
    "John Doe",
    "foo@gmail.com"
  ],
  [
    "ct",
    "Jane Doe",
    "bar@gmail.com"
  ]
]
```



Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

Previous attacks enabled by browser quirks


Idea: find other ways to leak private data

- Are there dynamic JavaScript files?
- If so, do these files contain user data?
- Can this data be leaked in a similar way?



Methodology

Detection of dynamic JavaScript files



http://vuln.com



```
545 .AddComment lbl("Tips use" 377 .Comment.Visible = True
546 .Comment.Visible = False 378 End With
547 End If 379 .looked = False
548 End With 380 If multiline() Then
549 With objCtrl(1 + j + j, 2) 381 .AddComment lbl("Tips use
550 .Name = ans(i) 382 .indentLevel = 1
551 .Interior.ColorIndex = COLOR_ 383 .Comment.Visible = False
552 .BackColor = RGB(255, 255, 255) 384 .WrapText = True
553 .Locked = False 385 .VerticalAlignment = xlTop
554 If multiline() Then 386 .AutoSize = True
555 .WrapText = True 387 Else
556 .VerticalAlignment = xlTop 388 .VerticalAlignment = xlVA
557 .AutoSize = True 389 .HorizontalAlignment = xl
558 End If 390 .AutoSize = True
559 End With 391 End If
560 Next i 392 End With
561 ActiveWindow.DisplayHeadings = False 393 .Value = ""
562 Range("B2:B100").Select 394 .VerticalAlignment = xlTop
563 End With 395 End With
564 MyProtect.wsh 396 Next i
565 Dim i As Integer 397 ActiveWindow.DisplayHeadings = False
566 398 ActiveWindow.Zoom = 80
```



Methodology

Registered accounts with 150 popular sites

We investigated each site by...

- ...seeding the accounts with personalized data
- ...thoroughly interacting with the site with our extension
- ...manually investigating the dynamic scripts



Empirical Study


Are there JavaScript files that contain user data?

	No. of Domains
Total data set	150
Dynamic scripts based on cookies	49
Contained unique identifiers	34
Contained other personal data	15
Contained CSRF or auth tokens	7



Cross-Site Script Inclusion

<http://attacker.org/>



Cross-Site Script Inclusion

Leaking data stored in global variables

```
// local variable at top level
var first_name = "John";

// variable missing the "var" keyword
last_name = "Doe";

// global variable
window.user_email = "john@doe.com";
```

dynamic.js

```
console.log(first_name); // John
console.log(last_name); // Doe
console.log(user_email); // john@doe.com
```

attacker.js



Cross-Site Script Inclusion

Leaking data via global functions

```
dynamic.js  
  
function example() {  
    var email = "john@doe.com";  
  
    window.MyLibrary.doSomething(email);  
};  
  
example();
```

```
attacker.js  
  
window.MyLibrary = {};  
window.MyLibrary.doSomething = function(email) {  
    console.log(email);  
};
```



Empirical Study - Analysis

Can data within JavaScript files be leaked across origin?

	No. of Domains	Exploitable
Dynamic scripts based on cookies	49	40
Contained unique identifiers	34	28
Contained other personal data	15	11
Contained CSRF or auth tokens	7	4



DEMO

a.k.a. we are feeling lucky



Empirical Study - Case Studies

XSSI -> CSRF -> XSS -> Facebook post

- A news site hosted a script containing the CSRF token
- The CSRF token enabled us to send profile change requests
- In the profile page there was a XSS
- A Facebook auth token was stored inside a cookie

Taking over an account at a file hosting service

- Utilized an Ajax driven Web UI
- An authentication token was required for these XHRs
- The token was provided inside a script file



Preventing XSS Vulnerabilities

Our attacks are not based on browser-quirks

- Hence, they cannot be fixed on a browser level
- It is very difficult to craft a dynamic script not prone to the attack

Prevent script files from being included by a third-party

- Solution 1: Strict referrer checking (error-prone)
- Solution 2: Use secret tokens

Separate JavaScript code from sensitive data

- Create static JS files and load data dynamically at run time
- The data service can be protected via the SOP



XSSI and Content Security Policy

Recap: CSP is a mechanism for preventing XSS

- ...by white listing trusted JavaScript
- ...requires all inline scripts to be externalized into script includes

Dynamic inline scripts are not prone to XSSI

- Externalizing the script makes it vulnerable to XSSI
- Do not blindly move script to external files

CSP might make XSSI more wide-spread



Conclusion

We investigated the security of dynamic JavaScript files

- Dynamic generation of JS is wide-spread
- Many dynamic JS files include information based on a user's session
- Data contained inside script files can be accessed across origins

We conducted a study on 150 popular sites

- One third of these sites use dynamic scripts
- 80% of these sites were vulnerable to XSSI
- Consequences range from privacy issues up to full account compromise

Introducing CSP will likely make the problem worse



Questions?

kittenpics.org

Sebastian Lekies
@slekies

Ben Stock
@kcotsneb

Martin Johns
@datenkeller

