Didn't You Hear Me?

Towards More Successful Web Vulnerability Notifications

Ben Stock, Giancarlo Pellegrino, Frank Li, Michael Backes, and Christian Rossow









Motivation and Research Questions

- Prior works in this area had limited impact
 - Low fix rates
 - Main issue: few administrators reached
- Our work: understand why notifications did not perform better and determine improvements
 - Message format/tone
 - High-effort channels







Types of Disclosed Issues

- Well-known vulnerabilities for <u>WordPress</u> (14,815 domains, Top 1M)
 - Two Cross-Site Scripting Flaws (CVE-2016-4566, CVE-2016-4567)
 - determined by hash values of vulnerable Flash files



- Misconfigured Git repositories (9,721 domains, Top 1M)
 - Checked presence and format of .git/config
 - Removed known public repositories (based on hash of last commit)




- Publicly accessible <u>core dumps</u> (790 domains, Top 1M)
 - excluded later in the experiment
 - one hoster responsible for 30% of affected sites





Different Types of Notifications

- Plain text emails
 - Real name sender (Plain),
 "Vulnerability Notification" sender (Mailbot),
 Signed emails (S/MIME)
- HTML emails
 - HTML with all information included (**HTML**), HTML with externally linked logo (**Tracking**)
- Friendly tone
 - Merely information that some flaws was detected
 - asked for right contact to provide more info



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Hello,

I am a security researcher at the Center for IT-Security, Privacy and Accountability at Saarland University, Germany.

I have found a vulnerability in your site domain.com. I would like to disclose the vulnerability to the correct contact. Could you please point me to that person or confirm that this is you?

Thank you and best regards,
Ben

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Dr.-Ing. Ben Stock
Center for IT-Security, Privacy and Accountability (CISPA)
Saarland University
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Notification Procedure

- Used only directly available channels
 - security/abuse/webmaster/info@domain.com, WHOIS abuse contact
- Split up data set of vulnerable domains into seven groups
 - different messages and control group
- Bi-weekly emails
 - February 3rd, February 17th, March 3rd







Results of our Notification




Remediation Overview








Access Reports over Time






Insights from Tracking Analysis




Spam Filtering

- Analyzed fraction of tracked emails per provider
 - Removed bounces first
 - Google, Microsoft-hosted (business), all other providers
- Assumption: inherent email access levels do not vary
- Drastic difference between providers
 - likely due to Google's spam filters







Read emails to viewed report to fixed issues





Parameters to the Success of a Notification Campaign






Manual Notification



Manual Notification - Channels and Availability


- Randomly sampled 970 unfixed domains
 - only domains without previous viewed reports
- Manually checked each site for contact info
 - · considered postal, email, forms, social media, and phone
 - ~90% had at least one
- Randomly assigned channel to each domain
 - to avoid bias, availability of channel not considered
 - only 364/970 domains could be contacted






Manual Notification - Roadblocks













- 60 hours of manual work
 - 40 hours for contact lookup
 - 20 hours for notifications
- Reaching
 - Notable improvement for Git
 - small improvement for WordPress
- Fix: no improvements
- Bias needs to be considered






Quo Vadis Vulnerability Notifications

- Better Delivery Mechanisms
 - security@ bounced for 85% of all domains
 - Google's spam filter likely had significant impact on success
- Increasing Trust in Notifications
 - only between 1/6 and 1/4 followed up on our information
 - prior work with Search Console yielded 80% reactions
- Tailored Notifications
 - low fix rates for WordPress indicate lack of proper understanding







Thanks!





